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Scientific Evidence and Expert Testimony: 
One Potato, Two Potato, Daubert, Frye 
Maryland Judicial Institute 
September 23, 2009 
Lynn McLain 
University of Baltimore School of Law 
The goal of scientific research is to increase our knowledge. As knowledge grows, 
previously well-accepted theories are cast off and replaced by new theories, which in time may 
be refined or rejected. Though the world was once believed to be flat, we believe it to be rather 
round today. Newton's discovery of gravity still holds, so far. ... 
Expert testimony has been admitted in America since the 1600's; for example, a Dr. 
Brown gave "'scientific'" testimony at a heresy trial that the defendant had "bewitched" several 
persons. 1 How should trial judges filter which scientific and other expert evidence is admissible? 
The applicable Maryland Rules, found in Title 5, are essentially the same as the corollary 
Federal Rules of Evidence? The most salient difference in their application is that the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland continues to apply the "general acceptance" Frye-Reed standard to the 
admission of novel scientific evidence, while the federal courts, under Daubert ("Dow-burt") and 
its progeny use the Frye standard, when determining the admissibility of scientific evidence, as 
only one of several factors in a more flexible test evaluating relevance, reliability, and the relative 
helpfulness of all expert testimony (a Rules 401-702-403 test). This Rules 5-401-5-702-5-403 
test is applicable in Maryland to all expert testimony not covered by Frye-Reed. 
In either state or federal court, the first inquiry when any expert testimony is offered is, as 
with all evidence, is it relevant to the case? 
I Andre A. Moenssens & Fred E. Inbau, Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases § 1.02 at 4 
(2d ed. 1978) (citing Howell, State Trials 687 (1665)). 
2 This is especially true since Fed. R. Evid. 703 was amended in 2000 to follow an 
approach like that adopted in Md. Rule 5-703 in 1994. 
1 
I. Overview of Rules Analysis: 5-401 Relevance/Other Rules/5-403 Discretion 
1. Is the evidence relevant (does it have even 
a slight tendency to prove or disprove a 
fact that is of consequence to the case, 
Md. Rule 5-401)? ~ No. Inadmissible. 
~ 
Md. Rule 5-402. 
Yes. 
~ 
2. Is the evidence excluded by constitution, 
statute, specific rule in Title 5 of the 
Md. Rules, or case law not inconsistent 
with Title 5? ~ Yes. Inadmissible. 
~ 
Md. Rule 5-402. 
No. 
~ 
3. Should the trial court in its discretion 
exclude the evidence anyway, because 
the danger of its (1) causing unfair 
prejudice, or (2) confusing or misleading 
the jury, or (3) consuming too much time, 
substantially outweighs the probative 
value it adds to the case? ~ Yes. Inadmissible. 
~ 
Md. Rule 5-403. 
No. 
Admissible. 
As always, "the devil is in the details." Here the "details" are in Step 2 above: all the 
Rules except 5-401, 5-402, and 5-403! 
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• 
II. Lay Witness or Expert? 
Is the witness a lay witness, an expert but a "fact witness," or an expert witness for 
purposes of the discovery rules and the evidence rules? 
A. Is the witness neither shown to be qualified as an 
expert "by knowledge, skill, experience, training, 
or education," nor testifying based on scientific, 
technical, or other specialized knowledge? ---.~ No, treat as expert. 
See ll.B.2, Ill.-V. 
Yes, a lay witness. Md. Rule 5-701 applies. 
Is tbe Jtness testifying either to bis or ber opinion 
or to an inference he or she has made? 
Yes. 
(1) Is the opinion or inference (a) rationally 
based (b) on first-hand knowledge of 
(2) 
the witness? -----:.~ No. Inadmissible. 
Md. Rule 5-701(1) 
Yes. 
Will the opinion or inference help the 
fact-finder either (a) understand the 
witness's testimony or (b) determine a 
fact at issue in the case? 
Yes. 
Admissible (subject to Md. 
3 
---.~ No. Jury is in just as 
good a position to form 
an opinion as the 
witness is. 
Inadmissible. 
Md. Rule 5-701(2). 
Rule 5-403). 
Note: These determinations as to 
admissibility are all by the trial 
judge under Md. Rule 5-104(a). 
Testimony must be to 
"Just the facts, ma'am." 
See vol. 6 LYNN McLAIN, MARYLAND EVIDENCE: STATE AND FEDERAL §§ 
701:1-701:7 (2d ed. 2001 & Supp. 2009) (accessible on Westlaw as, e.g., "6 
Maryland Evidence 701:1 "); JOSEPH F. MURPHY, JR., MARYLAND EVIDENCE 
HANDBOOK §§ 603-603(F) (2d ed. 1999) (accessible on LEXIS by clicking on 
"Find a Source" and typing in "Maryland Evidence Handbook"). 
B. Witnesses with specialized knowledge may be called to testify either as fact 
witnesses or expert witnesses. 
1. Fact witnesses testify from first-hand knowledge to relevant facts in 
the case, and do not give expert opinions. For example, if an arresting 
officer testifies to what he or she observed, the officer is merely a fact 
witness and Md. Rule 5-701 applies. 
A fact witness may not testify to facts of which the witness has 
first-hand knowledge and then opine as to them - based on the witness's 
expertise gained from "specialized knowledge, skill, experience, or 
education" - unless there has been compliance with the discovery rules 
regarding expert testimony. Ragland v. State, 385 Md. 706, 870 A.2d 609 
(2005). But see Matoumba v. State, 390 Md. 544, 890 A.2d 288 (2006) 
(declining to apply Ragland holding to the testimony of a police officer in 
a suppression hearing). 
2. Expert witnesses may testify to their opinions, but are subject to 
special discovery and evidence rules. 
If the arresting officer testifies, for example, that the defendant 
swallowed "crack cocaine," rather than "something that looked like crack 
cocaine," the line has been crossed. Robinson v. State, 348 Md. 104, 115-
28, 702 A.2d 1263 (1997). 
3. Necessity for expert testimony 
Sometimes expert testimony is required in order for a party to meet 
its burden of production of evidence so as to survive a motion for 
summary judgment or a directed verdict against it. E.g., Wood v. Toyota 
Motor Corp., 134 Md. App. 512, 760 A.2d 315 (2000). See vol. 5 McLain 
§ 300:7; Murphy §§ 1401-1402. Such an expert's opinion generally must 
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Questions 
be given to at least "a reasonable degree of probability." See, e.g., Impala 
Platinum Ltd. v. Impala Sales (U.S.A.), Inc., 283 Md. 296, 333, 389 A.2d 
887,908 (1978) (expert witness's appraisal of present value oflost profits 
was within guidelines of reasonable certainty rule and was properly 
admitted in evidence). 
"[W]here a complex and novel theory of science has been 
postulated," the Court of Appeals has held that the courts ought look 
especially closely at admissibility, especially where "the area of 
expertise is central to the resolution of the lawsuit." Blackwell v. 
Wyeth, 408 Md. 575,627-29,971 A.2d 235 (2009) (affirming trial court's 
exclusion of plaintiffs , proffered experts - (1) a medical doctor and a 
genetic counselor, (2) a chemistry professor, (3) a pharmacology professor, 
(4) a pediatrician, and (5) a forensic psychiatrist, as unqualified to testify 
to epidemiological matters: a causal link between a mercury derivative in 
vaccines given to an infant and his autism and mental retardation). 
1. Police officer on narcotics squad is called to testify at trial that, based on his training and 
experience, what he observed: two telephone calls from separate pay phones, the 
movements of two vehicles, and something passing between them - was a drug 
transaction. This is: 
A. Lay testimony. 
B. Expert testimony. 
Ragland v. State, 385 Md. 706, 870 A.2d 609 (2005). 
2. A witness, a licensed driver who was on the highway at the time in question, testifies that 
she saw the civil defendant in an automobile tort case driving down the highway "at a 
very high rate of speed, tailgating, and weaving in and out of traffic." The evidence is: 
A. Admissible. 
B. Inadmissible. 
See Beahm v. Shortall, 279 Md. 321,339-40,368 A.2d 1005 (1977); Lilly v. State, 212 
Md. 436, 444, 129 A.2d 839 (1957). 
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3. The same witness testifies that the defendant was "at least negligent and I think grossly 
negligent. He scared me to death." The evidence is: 
A. Admissible. 
B. Inadmissible. 
See Baltimore v. C&O Ry. v. Moon, 118 Md. 380,391-92,84 A. 536 (1912); McCoy v. 
Hatmaker, 135 Md. App. 693, 720-23, 763 A.2d 1283 (2000). 
4. A buddy is called to testify that when he saw the DUI defendant leave the bar, the 
defendant was drunk. 
A. Admissible. 
B. Inadmissible. 
Crampton v. State, 71 Md. App. 375, 388, 525 A.2d 1087 (1987), aff'd on other grounds, 
314 Md. 265, 550 A.2d 693 (1998). 
5. Police officer is asked by the prosecutor whether the officer believes the defendant is 
guilty. The evidence is: 
A. Admissible. 
B. Inadmissible. 
Crawfordv. State, 285 Md. 431, 404 A.2d 244 (1979). 
6. Arresting police officer's testimony that he smelled marijuana smoke is: 
A. Admissible lay opinion, as long as witness is familiar with the smell of marijuana 
through past experience. 
B. Inadmissible unless officer is qualified as an expert. 
In re Ondrel M, 173 Md. App. 223, 228 & llll. 5-6,238-45,918 A.2d 543 (2007). 
III. Expert Witnesses: Overview 
If expert witness testimony is offered, it may be admitted if the court finds that it would 






Is the subject matter of the testimony 
appropriate? ------i.~ No. Inadmissible. 1 Md. Rule 5-702(2). 
Yes. 
1 
Is the particular witness qualified to 
testify on this subject? ---l.~ No. Inadmissible. 1 Md. Rule 5-702(1). 
Yes. 
1 
Is there a sufficient factual basis, 




------i.~ No. Inadmissible. 
Md. Rule 5-702(3). 
Admissible (subject to Md. Rule 5-403) 
4. What is the form that expert testimony may take? 
Fonn of testimony may be by opinion (Md. Rule 5-702), and the 
expert is not required to have first-hand knowledge ofthe underlying facts 
(Md. Rules 5-602 and 5-703). The fact that the opinion goes to an 
ultimate issue in the case does not necessarily exclude it, Md. Rule 5-704. 
The question generally remains whether the particular opinion will 
assist the trier offact, rather than be superfluous, unnecessary, or 
confusing. Md. Rule 5-702. 
See, e.g., Charles H. Steffey, Inc. v. High, 216 Md. 170, 173-74, 
139 A.2d 730 (1958) ("[AJ person who is qualified by study or experience, 
or both, to understand and explain the subject under consideration, may 
testify as to the manner in which a certain device or appliance operates. 
The test of admissibility of such testimony is whether it would probably 
aid the trier of fact to draw an accurate conclusion ... from the facts 
7 
already in evidence"; State Roads employee was properly permitted to 
testify to operation of three phase traffic signal). 
In criminal cases, there is a special caveat: experts permitted by 
statute, Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 9-120, may testify on an 
ultimate issue of sanity ("criminal responsibility") but otherwise may not 
state an opinion as to whether the defendant had a mental state or 
condition necessary for the charged crime. Md. Rule 5-704(b). 
5. Must the expert first give a detailed basis for his or her opinion? 
The court may permit the expert to testify to his or her opinion, and 
"reasons" for it, "without first testifying to the underlying facts or data," 
Md. Rule 5-705, as long as the court is satisfied that there is a sufficient 
factual basis for the opinion. Md. Rule 5-702(3). (lfthe court has doubts 
on that point, it may require the expert to first testify to the underlying 
facts or data. Md. Rule 5-705.) 
6. What if the underlying facts are inadmissible in evidence? 
The expert may base his or her opinion on otherwise inadmissible 
hearsay, as long as it is shown to be "of a type reasonably relied upon by 
experts in the particular field informing opinions or inferences on the 
subject. ... " Md. Rule 5-703(a). 
1 




Was it of a type reasonably relied on by experts 
in that field? (The court may require disclosure 
of that hearsay basis outside the hearing of the 
jury, see Md. Rule 5-1 04( c ) (court "shall" do so 
when "the interests of justice" so require), so that 
the court may rule, under Md. Rule 5-1 04( a), on 
the admissibility of the opinion under Md. 
Rule 5-702.). __ -... No. Opinion 1 inadmissible. 
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Yes. 
Opinion admissible (subject to 
Md. Rule 5-403, and in criminal 
cases, subject to the accused's 
confrontation right). 
7. Should an otherwise inadmissible hearsay basis be admitted on direct 
examination for the limited purpose of explaining the expert's 
opinion? 
If the court finds that such basis is "[i] trustworthy, [ii] necessary to 
illuminate testimony, and [iii] unprivileged," then it has the discretion to 
pennit disclosure to the jury on direct. If it does so, then, upon request, the 
court shall give a limiting instruction to the jury "to use those facts and 
data only for the purpose of evaluating the validity and probative value of 
the expert's opinion or inference." Md. Rules 5-703(b); 5-105. 
Regardless of whether the court pennits such disclosure on direct, 
the opponent may freely cross-examine the expert regarding the basis of 
his or her opinion. Md. Rule 5-703( c). 
See generally 6 McLain §§ 702:1-705:1; Murphy §§ 
1404-1404(B)(I), 1407-1408(A). 
IV. Qualifications of the Particular Witness as an Expert 
Is the witness "qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education," in the area as to which 




Md. Rule 5-702(1). 
See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 408 Md. 204, 223-25, 969 A.2d 262 (2009) (expert was 
qualified to testify about canine police work, but not about percentage of paper money 
that contains traces of illicit drugs). 
Trial judge decides this question under Md. Rule 5-1 04( a). Standard of appellate 
review: abuse of discretion, except that when standards for particular experts are 
established by statute, the trial court may not exclude such experts on the ground 
that they are unqualified. See In Re Adoption/Guardianship No. CCJ14746, 360 Md. 
634,647, 759 A.2d 755 (2000) (trial court did not abuse its discretion in pennitting a 
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certified clinical social worker to testify as to mental disorders; fact that a statute, Md. 
Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § 9-120, expressly authorizes licensed psychologists to 
testify "merely limits the court's discretion to deny a person in that class expert status for 
the purpose of testifying. When no such statute exists with regard to a person offered as 
an expert, however, the court has broad discretion to determine whether that person will 
be qualified as an expert or not.") (citation omitted). 
See generally 6 McLain § 702:4; Murphy §§ 602(B)(1), 1403-1403(A). 
Question 
7. An M.D. who practices internal medicine may not, as a matter of law, testify to his or her 
expert opinion as to gynecology. 
A. Correct. 
B. Incorrect. 
See Radman v. Harold, 279 Md. 167, 173,367 A.2d 472 (1977). Compare Ralston v. 
Smith & Nephew Richards, Inc., 275 F.3d 965, 968-70 (10th Cir. 2001) (because 
proffered testimony must pass Daubert analysis, mere possession of medical degree does 
not qualify a physician to testify concerning any medical-related issue). 
v. Appropriateness of the Subject Matter of, and Sufficiency of Factual Basis for, 
Expert Opinion 
A. Overview: Helpfulness, Required Basis, and Reliability 
Will the jury be in just as good a position to 




---~. Yes. Expert opinion on 
that topic is inadmis-
sible. The witness must 
"back up," either to an 
opinion that would be 
helpful, or all the way 
to the facts. Md. Rules 
5-702 and 5-704. 
Is there a sufficient factual basis in the 
admissible evidence to make the expert 
opinion relevant to the case? ---~. No. Inadmissible. 
1 





Is the expert opinion supported sufficiently, 
both by its factual basis and in its 
methodology, to be reliable? ------:~~ No. Inadmissible. 
Md. Rules 5-702(1) & 
(3) and 5-703. 
Is the underlying theory, method, or 
technique sound in principle? ---~~ No. Inadmissible. 
/ 
~~ ~~~_~~ Rule 5-702(1). 
Alternative 1: Alternative 2: Alternative 3: Alternative 4: 
Has it been Is it the proper If Frye-Reed applies, If Frye-Reed is 
recognized by subject of judicial has it been generally inapplicable, is the 
statute? notice? 1 accepted by scientists expert opinion 
Yes. ALiSSible. 
in the relevant field? relevant-reliable-and 
Yes. AJissible. 
not unduly 
Yes. Admissible. prejudicial or time-
E.g., radar, Md. Code Md. Rule 5-201. See, consummg; as 
Ann., Cts. & Jud. e.g., Faya v. See V.B.1-2 & 4 determined under a 
Proc. § 10-301; Almaraz, 329 Md. Daubert-type, Md. 
DNA, id.§ 10-915(c); 435,444-47,620 Rules 5-401/5-702/5-
blood tests in A.2d 327 (1993) 403 anariS? 
paternity (facts regarding HN 
proceedings, see Md. and AIDS); Reed v. 
Code Ann., Fam. State, 283 Md. 374, Yes. Admissible. 




tests, and the like") 
(dictum). 
See generally 5 McLain §§ 401:4 & 401:8; 6 McLain §§ 702:2-702:3; Murphy §§ 1406-1406(C). 
Once a scientific principle is statutorily approved, judicially noticed, or found to meet the 
Frye-Reed standard, the results of the tests that rely on that principle will be admitted if three 
more prerequisites are met: 
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.. .. 
1. Any equipment necessary for perfonning the test was in working order; 
2. The person operating the equipment or perfonning the test was qualified to do so; 
and 
3. That person did so properly. 
Questions 
8. A psychiatrist who interviewed the victim and has written extensively on child abuse is 
asked whether he believes the alleged sexual abuse victim's testimony. The evidence is: 
A. Admissible. 
B. Inadmissible. 
See Bohnert v. State, 312 Md. 266, 277,539 A.2d 657 (1988). 
9. A police officer with significant training and experience in law enforcement regarding 
illicit drugs is called by the State to testify as to the street value of recovered drugs, how 
much an addict would purchase at a time, and that the amount of drugs was not for 
personal consumption. 
A. Admissible in the court's discretion. 
B. Inadmissible as a matter oflaw. 
See Smiley v. State, 138 Md. App. 709, 719, 773 A.2d 606 (2001). 
10. The accused has pled not criminally responsible. He calls a psychiatrist to testify that, 
based on his interview with the murder defendant, the defendant panicked when a robbery 
did not go as he planned and that he did not have the intent to murder. 
A. Admissible 
B. Inadmissible. 
Hartless v. State, 327 Md. 558, 611 A.2d 581 (1992). 
12 
.. 
11. In the same case, the defense psychiatrist is called to testify to the defendant's 
"psychological profile," that he was under a tremendous amount of stress from his father. 
The defendant had not testified to (nor admitted other testimony to) his mental state. The 
trial judge excluded the evidence. 
A. Abuse of discretion to exclude. 
B. No abuse of discretion to exclude. 
Hartless, 327 Md. at 574-81; Waltermeyer v. State, 60 Md. App. 69,480 A.2d 831 
(1984). See State v. Smullen, 380 Md. 233, 844 A.2d 429 (2004); Beatty v. Trailmaster 
Products, Inc., 330 Md. 726, 625 A.2d 1005 (1993). 
12. Psychiatrist testifies that murder defendant has a mental disorder, because he has 
experienced an amnesic episode. The opinion is: 
A. Admissible. 
B. Inadmissible. 
Evans v. State, 322 Md. 24, 585 A.2d 204 (1991). 
See Rollins v. State, 392 Md. 455,497-509,897 A.2d 821 (2006) (medical examiner's 
testimony had sufficient factual basis, including her microscopic examination of slides, 
her predecessor's findings as to the physical condition of the victim, the findings of the 
M.E.'s investigator, and the police reports); City of Frederick v. Shankle, 367 Md. 5, 15-
16, 785 A.2d 749 (2001) (expert cannot testify in contradiction oflegislative presumption 
that jury must consider, underlying police and firefighters workers' compensation 
statute); Franch v. Ankney, 341 Md. 350, 361-65, 670 A.2d 951 (1996) (no error in 
striking experts' testimony as lacking sufficient basis). 
B. Reliability, Absent Statutory Recognition of Judicial Notice 
1. Frye-Reed Still Good Law in Maryland 
In a four-to-three decision in Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 391 A.2d 
364 (1978), the Court of Appeals affirmed the exclusion of "voiceprint" 
evidence on the ground that it was not generally accepted in the scientific 
community. Judge Eldridge, writing for the majority, supported the court's 
decision to adopt the Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) 
test on the following grounds: 
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(1) To admit evidence on which the scientific community 
disagrees would invite a confusing, time-consuming battle of the 
experts in each trial; 
(2) Such a battle would require the fact finder to resolve a 
dispute which even the relevant scientific community could not 
resolve; 
(3) Inconsistent results would no doubt occur; 
(4) Those could cause verdicts at odds with each other, 
solely because one fact-finder gave credence to a scientific 
principle and another did not, when, in fact, the principle was 
either universally true or not; and 
(5) The fact-finder might be tempted to give undue weight 
to any so-called "scientific" evidence. This temptation might be 
especially great when the scientific evidence, like that of the 
voiceprint in Reed, is offered scientifically to identify the 
perpetrator of the crime for which the defendant is being tried. 
In light of the desire for consistency, there is no presumption of 
correctness of a trial court's finding of general acceptance under the 
Frye-Reed standard; the question on appeal is merely whether the trial 
court's finding is "against the weight of the evidence rather than whether it 
is clearly erroneous." Cobey v. State, 73 Md. App. 233, 239, 533 A.2d 
944 (1987). In reviewing the trial court's decision, "the appellate court 
may consider evidence which was not presented to the trial court." !d. 
Judge Smith, joined by Chief Judge Robert Murphy and Judge 
Orth, dissented in Reed. The dissenters would have admitted the 
voiceprint evidence and let any dispute about its validity go to its weight. 
In an approach prescient of Daubert, they argued that the court should 
require only that scientific evidence have "reasonable reliability," rather 
than general acceptance. The dissent argued: 
(1) Maryland had not followed the 1923 Frye case before 
1978; 
(2) The Frye standard would exclude a great deal of 
probative scientific evidence; its application might cause the 
judicial system to lag years or decades behind scientific advances; 
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(3) The Frye standard developed in a case involving 
polygraphs, which pose special problems; 
(4) Courts admit much evidence that is of questionable 
reliability, including eyewitness testimony and voice identifications 
by lay witnesses, without imposing such a high standard; 
(5) The Frye standard does not give juries enough credit for 
being able to weigh scientific evidence, which can be attacked on 
cross-examination; and 
(6) The Frye standard is unclear about how the proof it 
requires may be produced. For example, there can be a problem in 
the determination of what is the relevant scientific community 
under Frye. Those who study a new field - such as voiceprints -
and are in its forefront are sometimes discredited by the courts as 
having too much of a personal stake in the process' validity. But 
those in related fields - such as physiology, anatomy, and 
acoustical sciences - may be unlikely to know enough to make an 
informed judgment. 
When it adopted Title 5, the Court of Appeals left to development 
through the case law whether it would continue to adhere to Frye-Reed or 
whether it might jettison that standard in favor of the then recent Daubert 
approach. Md. Rule 5-702, Committee Note. Since then it has reaffirmed 
its loyalty to Frye. E.g., Blackwell v. Wyeth, 408 Md. 575,971 A.2d 235 
(2009). Maryland is not alone in its fealty to Frye. Several other states, 
including Arizona, California, Florida, and Washington, have reaffinned 
Frye post-Daubert. 3 
The Court of Appeals has explained the application of Frye as 
follows: 
A trial court may take judicial notice of the reliability of 
scientific techniques and methodologies that are widely 
accepted within the scientific community. A trial court also 
may take notice that certain scientific theories are viewed as 
unreliable, bogus, or experimental. However, when it is 
unclear whether the scientific community accepts the scientific 
3 But see Note, Codifying Expert Testimony in Maryland Rules 5-702 and 5-703: Why 
Traditional AnalysiS Should be Generally Acceptable, 54 MD. L. REv. 1085 (1995) (urging 
Maryland's adoption of Daubert approach). 
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theory or methodology, we have noted that before testimony 
based on the questioned technique may be admitted into 
evidence, the reliability must be demonstrated. While the most 
common practice will include witness testimony, a court may take 
judicial notice of journal articles from reliable sources and other 
publications which may shed light on the degree of acceptance vel 
non [or not] by recognized experts of a particular process or view. 
The opinion of an "expert" witness should be admitted only if 
the court finds that "the basis of the opinion is generally 
accepted as reliable within the expert's particular scientific 
field." 
Montgomery Mut. Ins. Co. v. Chesson, 399 Md. 314, 327, 923 A.2d 939 
(2007) (citations omitted). 
But the continued allegiance to Frye does not end the inquiry. Maryland's 
appellate courts have not applied Frye-Reed to all expert testimony, or 
even to all scientific evidence. 
2. The $64,000 Question: When Does Frye Apply? 
a. Frye-Reed Applies to the Validity of Scientific Theories, Tests, 
and Techniques 
A Frye-Reed showing must be made as to evidence 
based on a "novel theory of science," Blackwell v. Wyeth, 408 
Md. at 627, or a "novel scientific method." Montgomery Mut. 
Ins. Co., 399 Md. at 327 ("Under the Frye-Reed test, a party must 
establish first that any novel scientific method is reliable and 
accepted generally in the scientific community before the court will 
admit expert testimony based upon the application of the 
questioned scientific technique.").4 
i. If the theory or method underlying an expert's opinion 
has been generally accepted, see State v. Baby, 404 Md. 
220, 266-71, 946 A.2d 463 (2008) (the testimony regarding 
"rape trauma syndrome" must pass the Frye-Reed test as to 
the reliability of the underlying theory); Montgomery Mut. 
Ins. Co., 399 Md. at 326-34 (remanding for a Frye-Reed 
4 But see Blackwell v. Wyeth, 408 Md. at 577 n.1 (overstating the proposition as "Frye-
Reed is the test in Maryland for determining whether expert testimony is admissible."). 
16 
hearing, to be held before trial and outside the presence of 
the jury; if plaintiff s doctor expert witness's testimony, 
"based on scientific opinion regarding the causal link 
between mold exposure and sick building syndrome" does 
not satisfy Frye-Reed, the judgment must be vacated), then 
the opinion itself need not meet that test: experts may 
testify to different opinions. Giddens v. State, 148 Md. 
App. 407,415-17,812 A.2d 1075 (2002) ("The Frye-Reed 
test applies to methodologies, not the conclusions drawn 
from applying the methodologies. ... ... It is ... well 
settled ... that if the relevant scientific community is in 
general agreement that a properly conducted scientific test 
will produce an accurate result, the Frye-Reed test does not 
operate to exclude conflicting expert opinions based upon 
such a test. Because expert pathologists do agree that a 
properly conducted autopsy will reveal lack of swelling in 
the victim's brain and spinal cord, nothing in Frye, Reed or 
Wilson requires the exclusion of Dr. Pestaner's 'time of 
injury' opinion based upon that autopsy finding."); Owens 
Corning v. Bauman, 125 Md. App. 454, 726 A.2d 745 
(1999) (trial court property permitted pulmonary 
pathologist to testify; Frye-Reed test did not apply to his 
testimony, which was not based on novel techniques or 
tests), as modified on clarification, (Apr. 7, 1999). 
ii. But the court must conduct a Frye-Reed hearing if the 
expert is proposing a novel theory, even one based on 
his or her own observations, experience, and study. 
In Blackwell v. Wyeth, 408 Md. 575 (2009), the 
plaintiffs brought suit alleging that their child's autism and 
mental retardation were caused by vaccinations containing 
the preservative thimerosal (an ethyl mercury derivative) 
that he received as an infant. Circuit Court Judge Berger 
entered summary judgment for the defendants upon 
concluding that the plaintiffs had failed to show that their 
experts' opinions as to causation, and the underlying 
analysis, met Frye-Reed. The Court of Appeals, in an 
extensive, unanimous opinion by Judge Battaglia, affirmed. 
It reviewed (1) de novo the legal question of 
admissibility under Frye-Reed, and (2) the exclusion of 
the plaintiffs' experts as unqualified, under the more 
deferential standard of abuse of discretion. 
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Judge Battaglia characterized the first question as 
involving "the application of the Frye-Reed test to the 
analysis undertaken by an expert where the underlying data 
and methods of gathering this data are generally accepted in 
the scientific community but applied to support a novel 
theory." She reviewed numerous well-respected studies 
which Circuit Court Judge Berger had reviewed, that had 
concluded that the scientific evidence to date shows no link 
between thimerosal and autism. 
The plaintiffs' principal expert and his son had 
conducted the only studies showing such a link "in a small 
number of genetically susceptible individuals." But the 
methodology of their studies had been criticized by the 
American Academy of Pediatrics and the National 
Academy of Sciences' Institute of Medicine. In 
reevaluating the trial court's resolution of the Frye-Reed 
issue, the Court of Appeals explicitly borrowed from the 
"reliability" analysis of the federal courts (although the 
federal courts had applied Daubert). Following their 
reasoning, the Maryland court held that "[g]eneraUy 
accepted methodology must be coupled with generally 
accepted analysis," so that expert opinion based on " 
'too great a leap' " must be excluded. 
b. Lack of Uniformity; Some Earlier Language Has Been 
Rejected 
When to apply Frye has proved troublesome for every Frye 
jurisdiction, and no clear, uniform standard has emerged. See, e.g., 
Logerquist v. McVey, 1 P.3d 113 (Ariz. 2000) (vacating trial 
court's order excluding plaintiffs expert's testimony regarding 
sexual abuse victim's repressed memory; Frye is inapplicable: " 
'Although compliance with Frye is necessary when the scientist 
reaches a conclusion by applying a scientific theory or process 
based on the work or discovery of others, under Rules 702 and 703 
experts may testify concerning their own experimentation and 
observation and opinions based on their own work without first 
showing general acceptance. Such evidence need only meet the 
traditional requirements of relevance and avoid substantial 
prejudice, confusion, or waste of time.' "). Compare Marsh v. 
Valyou, 977 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 2007) (per curiam) (Frye does not 
apply to a medical expert's "pure opinion" testimony regarding 
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causal link between trauma and fibromyalgia, but even if Frye did 
apply, it was satisfied by the testifying expert) with, e.g., Ramirez 
v. State, 810 So. 2d 836 (Fla. 2001) (procedure for identification of 
knife marks failed Frye test). 
Maryland's Court of Appeals decisions in Blackwell v. 
Wyeth and Montgomery Mutual Ins. Co. attempt to resolve 
confusion engendered by earlier appellate decisions, most notably 
State v. Allewalt, 308 Md. 89,98,517 A.2d 741 (1986), where the 
Court of Appeals held that Frye-Reed did not apply to the 
admissibility of expert testimony that an alleged rape victim 
suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), when offered 
to rebut a defense of consent. The Allewalt majority states: 
The analysis by the Court of Special Appeals erects an 
unreasonably high standard for the admissibility of medical 
opinion evidence. The analysis also mischaracterizes the 
evidence in this case as if the medical opinion had been 
presented as a scientific test the results of which were 
controlled by inexorably physical laws. Further, the 
analysis ignores [the psychiatrist's] opinion that, based on 
the history [given him by the victim], the stressor causing 
PTSD in [the victim] following June 25, 1983, was what 
she said was a rape occurring on that day. 
Allewalt was followed by Myers v. Celotex Corp., 88 Md. App. 
442,594 A.2d 1248 (1991), where the Court of Special Appeals 
held that the trial court committed reversible error in applying the 
Frye-Reed standard to a doctor's opinion testimony as to how 
asbestos directly causes cancer. The appellate court held that the 
doctor should have been permitted to testifY, when he testified his 
opinion rose to a "reasonable medical probability," "even though 
he could not state that the theory he espoused was generally 
accepted by the medical community." It reasoned that the Frye 
doctrine did not apply, because the doctor was not testifYing as to 
"the validity of a new scientific technique" such as lie detector 
tests, breathalyzer tests, or paraffin tests. Myers relied on Allewalt 
to hold that Frye-Reed does not extend" 'to medical opinion 
evidence which is not presented as a scientific test the results of 
which were controlled by inexorable, physical laws. ' " 
Again, in CSXv. Miller, 159 Md. App. 123,858 A.2d 1025 
(2004) the Court of Special Appeals relied on Myers to find Frye-
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Reed inapplicable to a medical opinion regarding the etiology of a 
workers' compensation claimant's osteoarthritis. 
In Montgomery Mutual Ins. Co., Judge Raker distinguished 
Allewalt, CSX, and Myers from the case before the court: 
The instant case differs from both CSX and Myers. It 
involves more than a generally accepted medical opinion 
and diagnosis. Dr. Shoemaker employs medical tests to 
reach a conclusion [regarding toxic mold and sick building 
syndrome] that is not so widely accepted as to be subject to 
judicial notice of reliability. Further, as we noted in Reed, 
novel medical theories regarding the causes of medical 
conditions have been subject to Frye analysis. Reed, 283 
Md. At 383,391 A.2d at 369 (noting that the Frye test had 
been applied to "medical testimony regarding the cause of 
birth defects"). 
399 Md. At 332-33 (footnote omitted). She pointed out that in 
Allewalt there was " 'no issue ... over the fact that psychiatrists 
and psychologists recognize PTSD [post-traumatic stress disorder] 
as an anxiety disorder.' " Id. At 332. Judge Battaglia, writing for 
the court in Blackwell v. Wyeth, reiterated this distinction. 
The language in Allewalt regarding Frye-Reed has been 
distinguished to extinction. 
c. Other Maryland Cases Regarding Application of Frye-Reed 
i. Brands of Devices Used to Apply Established Principles, 
No 
Frye-Reed was held inapplicable to the accuracy of 
particular products or devices used to apply established 
scientific principles. Goldstein v. State, 339 Md. 563, 573, 
664 A.2d 375 (1995). The defense "conceded that the use 
oflasers to measure speed is generally accepted within the 
relevant scientific community." The Court of Appeals held 
that the design of the particular gun used to measure speed 
of defendant's motor vehicle - rather than the underlying 
theory - was not subject to Frye-Reed. 
ii. DNA Evidence: RFLP, No; PCR, Yes 
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(a) RFLP (Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphism) 
Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 10-
91S(c) makes DNA evidence collected using the 
RFLP technique admissible, so that generalized 
challenges to its admissibility are precluded. 
Armstead v. State, 342 Md. 38, 673 A.2d 221 
(1996) (over dissent of Bell, J.). The statute also 
makes admissible expert testimony to statistics 
showing the odds of a random match (in Armstead, 
1 in 480,000,000 and 1 in 800,000, respectively), 
under either the "product rule" or the "ceiling 
principle" method. See, e.g., Wilson v. State, 132 
Md. App. 510, 523, 752 A.2d 1250 (2000).5 
RFLP DNA evidence may be excluded only 
if it is irrelevant, or if case-specific defects in the 
testing procedure make particular results unhelpful. 
The trial judge must permit the defense to cross-
examine a State's DNA expert about testing errors 
and incidents of contamination at the lab in 
question. Williams v. State, 342 Md. 724, 744-52, 
679 A.2d 1106 (1996) (reversible error to restrict 
that line of questioning). 
The statute does not preclude a trial 
judge from excluding evidence of a DNA profile 
if the court concludes that the laboratory in 
question did not follow proper procedures, so 
that the test results are unhelpful. A procedure 
like the following, endorsed by several federal 
courts of appeals, seems appropriate (except that the 
Maryland statute obviates the need for taking 
judicial notice): 
[I]n future cases ... , a court could properly 
take judicial notice of the general 
5 But see Weinstein, Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence is Sound; It Should Not 
Be Amended, 138 F.R.D. 631,644-45 (advocating giving a much more conservative figure as to 
the probability of a non-match than has been given in some cases, or using "a phrase such as 
'very highly probable,' without quantification"). 
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acceptability of the general theory and the 
use of these specific [DNA] techniques. 
Beyond such judicial notice [in Maryland, 
statutory recognition], the threshold for 
admissibility should require only a 
preliminary showing of reliability of the 
particular data to be offered, i.e., some 
indication of how the laboratory work was 
done and what analysis and assumptions 
underlie the probability calculations. The 
probability data may well vary among 
different segments of the population. 
Affidavits should normally suffice to 
provide a sufficient basis for admissibility. 
DNA profiling evidence should be excluded 
only when the government cannot show this 
threshold level of reliability in its data. The 
district court should focus on whether 
accepted protocol was adequately followed 
in a specific case, but the court, in exercising 
its discretion, should be mindful that this 
issue should go more to the weight than to 
the admissibility of the evidence. Rarely 
should such a factual determination be 
excluded from jury consideration. With 
adequate cautionary instructions from the 
trial judge, vigorous cross-examination of 
the government's experts, and challenging 
testimony from defense experts, the jury 
should be allowed to make its own factual 
determination as to whether the evidence is 
reliable. 
United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786, 791-800 
(2d Cir. 1992). Accord United States v. Martinez, 3 
F.3d 1191 (8th Cir. 1993) (post-Daubert). See 
United States v. Beasley, 102 F.3d 1440, 1448 (8th 
Cir. 1996) (laboratory error may form the basis of 
evidence exclusion only when a reliable 
methodology was so altered by the laboratory as to 
skew the methodology itself) (cited with approval in 
United States v. Davis, 602 F.Supp.2d 658, 664 (D. 
Md.2009). 
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(b) PCR (Polymerase Chain Reaction) 
DNA testing using the PCR technique or 
any non-RFLP technique must be evaluated 
under Frye-Reed. Armstead; Wagner v. State, 160 
Md. App. 531, 542-52, 864 A.2d 1037 (2005) (no 
error in finding that mitochondrial DNA (mt 
DNA) met Frye-Reed test; potential for 
contamination went only to weight of the evidence 
and did not make it inadmissible); Chase v. State, 
120 Md. App. 141, 153, 706 A.2d 613 (1998) (PCR 
evidence passed Frye-Reed test). See United 
States v. Davis, 602 F.Supp.2d 658 (D. Md. 2009) 
(DNA evidence based on PCR, which generally 
requires sample of at least 100 picograms, is 
generally accepted as reliable). 
(c) Need for Contextual Statements 
In light of the advances made in DNA 
analysis since Armstead was decided in 1996, the 
Court of Appeals held in 2005 that "when a DNA 
method [here PCR]6 analyzes genetic markers at 
sufficient locations to arrive at an infinitestimal 
random match probability, expert opinion 
testimony of a match and of the source of the 
DNA evidence is admissible," Young v. State, 388 
Md. 99, 100,879 A.2d 44 (2005), and "the expert 
is not required to accompany his 'match' 
testimony with contextual statistics." !d. at 105. 
In Young, the trial court had committed no error in 
admitting expert testimony, following an analysis of 
13 loci, that to "a reasonable degree of scientific 
certainty (in the absence of an identical twin)" the 
defendant was the source of the analyzed DNA. Id. 
at 103. Judge Raker, writing for a unanimous court, 
noted, however, that if the accused has a close 
relative, "typically" a sibling, "who could have been 
6 Although Young involved PCR evidence, the defendant did not challenge its admission 
on the ground that it failed Frye-Reed nor did the Court of Appeals address that issue. 388 Md. 
at 108 n.6. 
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the source of the DNA evidence," because he or she 
is "in the pool of potential contributors of crime 
scene evidence," then "the expert's caveat should 
take into account the higher random match 
probability for close relatives, not only identical 
twins." !d. at 120 n.12. 
iii. Dog Tracking In, But Does Frye Apply? 
Compare Clark v. State, 140 Md. App. 540, 578-79, 
781 A.2d 913 (2001) (tracking by adequately trained dogs 
meets Frye-Reed) with State v. Roscoe, 700 P.2d 1312, 
1319-20 (Ariz. 1984) (evidence admissible, but Frye 
inapplicable, as evidence "was not bottomed on any 
scientific theory"). See Johnson v. State, 408 Md. 204, 223 
& n.5, 969 A.2d 262 (2009) (evidence that dog trained to 
find drugs alerted to defendant's pants was properly 
admitted) (not mentioning Frye-Reed). 
iv. PIP Statute: Frye Does Not Apply 
The Court of Appeals has held that PIP (Personal 
Injury Protection) benefits should be available if medical 
techniques are shown to have "efficacious material value 
... as a diagnostic aid"; agreement by a majority of the 
medical or academic community is not required). Saba tier 
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 323 Md. 232, 592 A.2d 
1098 (1991). 
v. Repressed Memory: Yes, Frye Applies 
The Court of Appeals used the Frye-Reed test in 
concluding that "repressed memory" was insufficiently 
distinguishable from mere forgetting so as to toll an 
otherwise applicable statute oflimitations. Doe v. Maskell, 
342 Md. 684, 694, 679 A.2d 1087 (1996) ("While the 
existence of consensus (or lack thereof) in the scientific 
community is a more familiar inquiry within the context of 
determining the admissibility of scientific evidence under 
the test enunciated in Reed, it is also a useful measure for 




13. A clinical social worker wishes to testifY that an alleged victim of child sexual abuse is 
suffering from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) as a result of being sexual abused. 
Is the evidence ofPTSD subject to Frye-Reed? 
A. Yes. 
B. No. 
See Hutton v. State, 339 Md. 480,495 n.10, 663 A.2d 1289 (1995). 
14. In 13., may the psychiatrist testifY to her conclusion that the victim was sexually abused 
and was not "faking" her symptoms? 
A. Yes. 
B. No. 
Hutton. See Hall v. State, 107 Md. App. 684, 670 A.2d 962 (1996). 
See also, e.g., United States v. Betcher, 534 F.3d 820, 825-26 (8th Cir. 2008), cert. 
denied, 129 S.Ct. 962 (U.S. 2009) (no abuse of discretion to admit child abuse expert's 
testimony regarding age-appropriate sexual behavior, delayed reporting, and child 
pornography as a form of child abuse). 
15. To impeach the victim's identification, a psychologist is called by the criminal defendant 
to testifY to the frailties of eyewitness identification, particularly cross-racial 
identification. The defendant is well known to the victim, and there is physical evidence 
placing the defendant at the crime scene. Is the evidence subject to Frye-Reed? 
A. Yes. 
B. No. 
Bloodsworth v. State, 307 Md. 164, 184 (512 A.2d 1056 (1986). 




See Bomas v. State, 181 Md. App. 204,956 A.2d 215 (2008), cert. granted, 406 Md. 743, 
962 A.2d 370 (2008) (if Bloodsworth's test is to be altered, it must be by the Court of 
Appeals; in instant case, no abuse of discretion in excluding defense expert's testimony 
regarding memory curve and eyewitness identification, where court found expert's 
opinion not helpful regarding particular police witness); Thompson v. State, 167 Md. 
App. 513,526-27,893 A.2d 1169 (2006). 
3. The $128,000 Question: What Standard for Expert Testimony Applies 
in Maryland When Frye Does Not Apply? 
a. Daubert (aJk/a 401-702-403) 
In 1993 the United States Supreme Court decided Daubert 
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) in 
which it held that the Federal Rules of Evidence superseded Frye 
with regard to the admission of scientific evidence. The Court set 
forth a number of criteria that a trial court ought consider in 
exercising its gatekeeping function to exclude unreliable, "junk 
science" so as to admit only reliable expert testimony on scientific 
matters. In its 1999 decision in Kumbo Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 
526 U.S. 137 (1999), the Court made clear that this responsibility 
of the district court applies equally to all proffered expert 
testimony, including opinions on non-scientific matters, 
"technical" matters, or "other specialized knowledge." 
i. Federal Cases Pre-Daubert 
Prior to Daubert, the federal courts were divided as 
to what standard applied with regard to proof of reliability 
of the principle or technique underlying scientific evidence, 
if judicial notice of that principle or technique was 
inappropriate. Some adhered to the Frye test. Others had 
rejected the Frye test in favor of an ad hoc Fed. R. Evid. 
401-702-403 balancing. E.g., United States v. Baller, 519 
F.2d 463 (4th Cir. 1975) ("Unless an exaggerated popular 
opinion of the accuracy of a particular technique makes its 
use prejudicial or likely to mislead the jury, it is better to 
admit relevant scientific evidence in the same manner as 
other expert testimony and allow its weight to be attacked 
by cross-examination and refutation."). These latter courts 
applied the general relevance standard of Fed. R. Evid. 
401, coupled with Fed. R. Evid. 702's admonition that 
any expert testimony must be helpful to the trier of fact. 
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Then the trial court must consider Fed. R. Evid. 403: if 
the helpful, probative value of the evidence is 
substantially outweighed by the considerations of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading or 
distraction of the trier of fact, or waste of time, the trial 
court, in its discretion, should exclude the evidence. 
ii. Daubert 
In Daubert the United States Supreme Court joined 
this 401-702-403 camp. The Court held that the Federal 
Rules of Evidence rejected Frye, although the degree of 
acceptance of a particular method or test within the 
scientific community remains a relevant factor for the trial 
court to consider in performance of its limited "gatekeeping 
role" to keep out junk science. The Court declined to set 
forth a "definitive" test for the admission of novel scientific 
evidence pursuant to its "reliability approach," 509 U.S. 
at 595 n.12, but offered the following "general 
observations. " 
Ordinarily, a key question to be answered in 
determining whether a theory or technique is 
scientific knowledge that will assist the trier of fact 
will be whether it can be (and has been) tested. * * * 
Another pertinent consideration is whether the 
theory or technique has been subjected to peer 
review and publication. Publication (which is but 
one element of peer review) is not a sine qua non of 
admissibility .... * * * Additionally, in the case of 
a particular scientific technique, the court ordinarily 
should consider the known or potential rate of error. 
. .. Finally, "general acceptance" can yet have a 
bearing on the inquiry. A "reliability assessment 
does not require, although it does permit, explicit 
identification of a relevant scientific community and 
an express determination of a particular degree of 
acceptance within that community." Widespread 
acceptance can be an important factor in ruling 
particular evidence admissible, and "a known 
technique that has been able to attract only minimal 
support within the community," may properly be 
viewed with skepticism. 
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Id. at 593-94. 
The DaubertlKumho Tire 401-702-403 approach is 
more flexible and, on its face, more liberal than Frye, as 
the Daubert Court relies not on a strict rule of preclusion of 
evidence, but on "the adversary system": "Vigorous cross-
examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful 
instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and 
appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible 
evidence." Id. at 596. 
Yet it does not permit the introduction of 
evidence unless the supporting proof suffices "to allow a 
reasonable juror to conclude that the position [taken] 
more likely than not is true .... " Id. For example, on 
remand the Daubert court reached the same conclusion it 
had reached when it erroneously had applied Frye: it found 
the plaintiff s proffered evidence that Bendectin, an anti-
nausea drug prescribed during pregnancy, had caused 
severe birth defects, and again granted defendants' motion 
for summary judgment. 
The flexibility ofthe Daubert test also could permit 
a court to exclude scientific evidence that while still 
"generally accepted," has begun to be proved umeliable. 
All in all, Daubert has engendered thorough pretrial vetting 
by federal judges of proffered expert testimony in every 
field. As explained by the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Fourth Circuit: 
A district court considering the admissibility of 
expert testimony exercises a gate keeping 
function to assess whether the proffered evidence 
is sufficiently reliable and relevant. The inquiry 
to be undertaken by the district court is "a 
flexible one" focusing on the "principles and 
methodology" employed by the expert, not on the 
conclusions reached. In making its initial 
determination of whether proffered testimony is 
sufficiently reliable, the court has broad latitude to 
consider whatever factors bearing on validity that 
the court finds to be useful; the particular factors 
will depend upon the unique circumstances of the 
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expert testimony involved. The court, however, 
should be conscious of two guiding, and sometimes 
competing, principles. On the one hand, the court 
should be mindful that Rule 702 was intended to 
liberalize the introduction of relevant expert 
evidence. And, the court need not determine 
that the expert testimony a litigant seeks to offer 
into evidence is irrefutable or certainly correct. 
As with all other admissible evidence, expert 
testimony is subject to being tested by "[v]igorous 
cross-examination, presentation of contrary 
evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of 
proof." On the other hand, the court must 
recognize that due to the difficulty of evaluating 
their testimony, expert witnesses have the 
potential to "be both powerful and quite 
misleading." And, given the potential 
persuasiveness of expert testimony, proffered 
evidence that has a greater potential to mislead than 
to enlighten should be excluded. 
Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi AB, 178 F.3d 257,261 (4th 
Cir. 1999) (no error in admitting doctor's testimony) 
(citations and footnote omitted). 
The specific factors listed in Daubert may not 
always be useful to the relevance-reliability-unfair 
prejudice analysis. See First Tennessee Bank Nat 'I Ass 'n 
v. Barreto, 268 F.3d 319, 331-35 (6th Cir. 2001) ("[W]e 
find the Daubert reliability factors unhelpful in the present 
case, which involves expert testimony derived largely from 
Iorlano's own practical experiences throughout forty years 
in the banking industry."). 
b. When Frye Does Not Apply, Maryland Essentially Follows 
Daubert (5-401 Relevance - 5-702 Reliability - 5-403 
Discretion) 
See generally Edward J. Imwinkelreid, The Importance of 
Daubert in Frye Jurisdictions, 42 CRIM. L. BULL. 215, 218 (2006) 
("[A]1though its judicial adherents tout Frye as a rigorous, 
conservative admissibility standard, the standard is severely 
cabined and applies to only a limited range of expert testimony. 
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The proponent of expert evidence can escape Frye scrutiny if he or 
she can convince the trial judge that: (1) the expert is relying on a 
traditional theory or technique; (2) the expert is offering soft 
scientific testimony; or (3) the witness's expertise is non-scientific 
in character. If the trial judge finds that any of these contentions 
applies in the pending case, the judge will not subject the expert's 
testimony to the general acceptance test.). 
4. Just Curious: Even When Frye Applies, Are the Results Different 
under Daubert? 
The answer is sometimes, but certainly not always. One would 
expect to find less consistency among Daubert cases on the same topic as 
there is in a Frye jurisdiction. But when there is disagreement among the 
scientific community, there generally will be disagreement emerging under 
either Daubert or Frye. Some examples of comparisons follow. 
a. Ballistics and Bullets: Comparative Bullet Lead Analysis 
(CBLA): Maryland Out under Frye, Federal In under Daubert 
i. Background 
In September 2005 the F .B.I. announced it had 
stopped performing CBLA for economic reasons but said it 
"still firmly supports the scientific foundation" of CBLA, 
the reliability of which a National Academy of Sciences 
report had questioned. Julie Bykowicz, FBI Lab Scraps 
Gunfire Residue, THE BALT. SUN, lA, col. 6, May 26, 
2006. 
ii. Maryland 
See Clemons v. State, 392 Md. 339, 896 A.2d 1059 
(2006) (reversible error to admit testimony concerning 
CBLA of bullets fired at victim and bullets recovered 
during traffic stop of defendant; CBLA does not pass Frye-
Reed, as "a genuine controversy [now] exists within the 
relevant scientific community about the reliability and 
validity of CBLA"). 
iii. Federal 
United States v. Mikos, 539 F.3d 706, 710-12 (7th 
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Cir. 2008) (no abuse of discretion in pennitting FBI 
ballistics agent to testify to CBLA), aff'g 2003 WL 
22922197 (N.D. Ill. 2003). 
See also United States v. Hicks, 389 F.3d 514, 525-
26 (5th Cir. 2004) (widespread acceptance by federal courts 
of fireanns comparison testing, here of spent shell casings 
with known weapon); United States v. Foster, 300 
F.Supp.2d 375 (D. Md. 2004) (FBI examiner's comparison 
of spent cartridge casings from two murders, when no 
known weapon found, admissible). But see infra 
V.B.4.c.iii, pp. 34-35 (cases limiting testimony as to 
certainty of match). 
b. Field Sobriety Tests: HGN Passes Frye, But Fails Daubert 
i. Maryland: HGN (Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus Test for 
Intoxication) Passes Frye 
State v. Blackwell, 408 Md. 677, 971 A.2d 296 
(2009) (HGN test, unlike other field sobriety tests, is a 
scientific test; reversible error to pennit trooper who 
administered it to motorist without expressly ruling trooper 
to be an expert) (over well-reasoned dissent of Murphy, J., 
regarding need for express ruling); Schultz v. State, 106 
Md. App. 145, 164-65,664 A.2d 60 (1995) (HGN test is a 
scientific test and meets Frye-Reed). But cf Crampton v. 
State, 71 Md. App. 375, 386-88, 525 A.2d 1087 (1987) 
("The Frye-Reed test does not apply to ... field sobriety 
tests [the one-leg stand; heel-to-toe; and recitation of 
alphabet given by police officers] because the latter are 
essentially empirical observations, involving no 
controversial, new, or 'scientific' technique. Their use is 
guided by practical experience, not theory."), aff'd on other 
ground, 314 Md. 265, 550 A.2d 693 (1988). 
ii. Federal: HGN fails Daubert 
United States v. Horn, 185 F.Supp.2d 530 (D. Md. 
2002) (Daubert applies; arresting officer could not refer, at 
trial on merits (as opposed to probable cause issue) to field 
sobriety tests-''walk and tum," "one leg stand," and 
"horizontal gaze nystagmus"-as tests, as they fail to meet 
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Daubert standards when offered to prove blood alcohol, 
content; officer could testify to observations; "In so doing, 
however, the officer may not use value-added descriptive 
language to characterize the subject's performance of the 
SFSTs, such as saying that the subject 'failed the test' or 
'exhibited' a certain number of 'standardized clues' during 
the test"). See United States v. Van Hazel, 468 F.Supp.2d 
792, 795-97 (E.D.N.C. 2007) (rejecting Horn's reasoning 
but excluding results altogether ofHGN test, as a 
"scientific test" which required evidence of test's 
reliability, judicial notice being inappropriate). 
c. Fingerprint Evidence: In Flux? 
i. National Academy of Sciences Report 
A 2009 National Academy of Sciences' National 
Research Council report has fueled the attack on 
admissibility of all forensic evidence, such as fingerprints, 
hair analysis, bite marks, and handwriting analysis, other 
than DNA, when used to identify an individual as well as 
weapons' tool marks. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF 
THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC 
SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD S-17 
(prepUblication Copy Feb. 2009) ("[B]ecause forensic 
scientists often are driven in their work by a need to answer 
a partiCUlar question related to the issues of a particular 
case, they sometimes face pressure to sacrifice appropriate 
methodology for the sake of expediency.") (cited in 
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S.Ct. 2527 (U.S. Jun. 
25,2009). 
ii. Maryland 
In Murphy v. State, 184 Md. 70, 86, 40 A.2d 239 
(1944), the Court of Appeals took "judicial notice of the 
fact that the use of fingerprints is an infallible means of 
identification. " 
More recently, the reliability of identification based 
on partial or "latent" prints has been questioned. Attracting 
national attention, Baltimore County Circuit Court Judge 
Susan M. Souder ruled in October 2007 that the 
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prosecution's experts could not testify at all regarding the 
ACE-V methodology when applied to partial "latent" 
prints. State v. Rose (No. K06-0545) (BaIt. Co. Cir. Ct., 
Oct. 19,2007). In light of the proven occurrence of "false 
positives" in other cases, Judge Souder found that the State 
expert's proffered testimony, that "there is no error rate for 
ACE-V" and that he was 1 00% certain that the latent prints 
were the defendant's was "not credible" and his entire 
testimony was inadmissible (though she demurred that, 
because "ACE-V methodology is changing," ACE-V 
evidence might be admissible in the future). Id. at 25. She 
seemed to apply a Daubert analysis rather than Frye-Reed, 
as she did not specifically find that the defense had proven 
that latent fingerprint analysis had lost general acceptance 
in the relevant scientific community. 
Excluding all of the fingerprint evidence precluded 
the jury from learning that the partial prints matched the 
defendant's known, rolled prints on at least several Galton 
points and did not exclude the defendant as having been at 
the scene. After Judge Souder reaffinned her ruling, the 
State felt it could not go forward with the case, and the U.S. 
Attorney stepped in to consider pursuing a federal 
prosecution. See McMenamin, u.s. Eyeing County Case, 
THEBALT. SUN, IB, col. 2, Feb. 21, 2008. 
Since Judge Souder's opinion, at least two 
Maryland trial judges have declined to follow it: Judge 
Patrick Cavanaugh of Baltimore County Circuit Court, 
McMenamin, Judge Rejects Request to Toss Out 
Fingerprints, THE BALT. SUN, 4B, col. 2, Nov. 1,2007, and 
Judge Dennis M. Sweeney of Howard County. State v. 
Johnson (No. 13-K-07-47I08) (Howard Co. Cir. Ct., Mar. 
26,2008). 
The State's witness in the Howard County case 
proffered that "he was able to fonn an opinion within a 
reasonable degree of certainty as to the identity of the 
person that left the latent print. ... " Id. at 11. Judge 
Sweeney held that he would pennit the expert to testify that 
he had found a close or exact "match" between the 
defendant's known print and the partial latent print, but not 
that "no other person in the world's print could also match 
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the latents," as "currently validated science" does not go 
that far. !d. at 21-23. The court held that the defense was 
free to cross examine as to the "alleged flaws" in the ACE-
V method, as well as to call its own expert. !d. at 23-24. 
iii. Federal: Admissible . .. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit was upheld, against a Daubert challenge, the 
admission of expert testimony regarding both fingerprints 
and handwriting. United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261 
(4th Cir. 2003). The majority of the panel found the 
reliability of the science of fingerprinting so well 
established that it need not be proved "every time opinion 
evidence is offered." Id. at 268. Accord United States v. 
Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215 (3d Cir. 2004) (testimony of 
qualified expert regarding latent fingerprints was properly 
admitted, but court committed harmless error in taking 
judicial notice that "human friction ridges are unique and 
permanent throughout the area of the friction ridge skin, 
including small friction ridge areas, and that human friction 
ridge skin arrangements are unique and permanent," as 
matter was subject to reasonable dispute); United States v. 
George, 363 F.3d 666, 672-73 (7th Cir. 2004) (FBI 
fingerprint examiner's testimony regarding partial prints 
was properly admitted); United States v. Sullivan, 246 
F.Supp.2d 700 (E.D. Ky. 2003) (ACE-V methodology for 
fingerprinting, as practiced by F.B.I., satisfied Daubert). 
But see United States v. Llera Plaza, 179 F.Supp.2d 492, 
57 Fed. R. Evid. Servo 983 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (withdrawn 
from F. Supp), vacated & superseded, 188 F.Supp.2d 599 
(E.D. Pa. 2002) (initially excluding opinion that fingerprint 
came from a particular person). 
The National Academy Report, however, may 
influence more courts to preclude absolutely positive 
"match" testimony, as did Judge Sweeney, and as have 
federal courts in other areas than fingerprints. United 
States V. Davis, 602 F.Supp.2d 658 (D. Md. 2009) (ruling 
admissible evidence regarding an initial match achieved by 
a "cold hit" from a DNA database when expressed as to 
rarity ofthe profile, rather than as random match 
probability, absent consensus as to the most reliable 
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statistical methodology to be applied); United States v. 
Glynn, 578 F.Supp.2d 567 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (prosecutor's 
ballistics expert would be limited to opining only that a 
firearms match was "more likely than not"); United States 
v. Green, 405 F.Supp.2d 104 (D. Mass. 2005) (detective 
could testify about shell casings, but not that they matched 
gun in question "to the exclusion of every other firearm in 
the world"); United States v. Hines, 55 F.Supp.2d 62 (D. 
Mass. 1999) (concluding that expert can testify to 
similarities or dissimilarities between handwriting samples 
but not render identification). 
d. Medical Opinions that Have Been Excluded Under Daubert 
A number of the federal "bottom-line" results as to 
admissibility seem consistent with those reached in Maryland. See, 
e.g., Attorney General o/Oklahoma v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 565 F.3d 
769, 780 (10th Cir. 2009) (no abuse of discretion in disregarding, 
on ground it was unreliable, testimony of state's experts who 
opined that they identified poultry litter DNA in waters of 
lllinois River Watershed; trial court properly applied Daubert's 
factors, including lack of peer review, because "when experts 
employ established methods in their usual manner, a district court 
need not take issue under Daubert; however, where established 
methods are employed in new ways, a district court may require 
further indications of reliability"); Henricksen v. Conocophillips 
Co., 605 F.Supp.2d 1142 (E.D. Wash. 2009) (excluding, as 
unreliable, experts' testimony regarding causal link between 
tanker driver's exposure to gasoline and his acute myelogenous 
leukemia (AML); Gross v. King David Bistro, Inc., 83 F.Supp.2d 
597 (D. Md. 2000) (absent close temporal connection or scientific 
studies supporting expert's opinion that infection with shigella 
sonnei caused fibromyalgia, opinion was too unreliable to admit). 
e. Polygraph: Out in Maryland, Sometimes In in Federal 
i. Maryland: Inadmissible 
Maryland excludes polygraph evidence as unreliable 
when offered to prove truthfulness or untruthfulness. E.g., 
State v. Hawkins, 326 Md. 270,275,604 A.2d 489 (1992); 
Kelley v. State, 288 Md. 298, 418 A.2d 217 (1980) 
(improper to allow witness to testify to opinion as to truth 
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and veracity, based on polygraph exam); Oliver v. State, 53 
Md. App. 490,496-97,545 A.2d 856 (1983) (rejecting 
evidence offered by defendant that prosecution witness 
refused to submit to polygraph examination). 
In 1998 the United States Supreme Court upheld 
Military Rule of Evidence 707, which, like Maryland case 
law, per se precludes the admission of polygraph evidence, 
as not violative of a court martial defendant's Fifth or Sixth 
Amendment rights to present a defense. United States v. 
Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 (1998). Four concurring justices 
suggested, however, that a per se rule of exclusion is not 
"wise." Id. at 318 (Kennedy, J., joined by O'Connor, 
Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ.). Justice Stevens dissented. 
ii. Federal: Court May Have Some Discretion 
E.g., United States v. Apperson, 441 F.3d 1162, 
1196 (10th Cir. 2006) (no abuse of discretion in excluding 
evidence that confidential informant took two polygraph 
tests and failed one, on ground that even if evidence 
satisfied Daubert, it was properly excluded for Fed. R. 
Evid. 403 reasons); United States v. Tokars, 95 F.3d 1520, 
1536 n.1O (11th Cir. 1996) ("[p]olygraph evidence may 
be admitted to impeach or corroborate testimony of a 
witness at trial within the court's discretion, so long as 
the opposing party has adequate notice of the evidence and 
an opportunity to secure its own polygraph."). 
But the majority of a panel of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has concluded that, 
due to post-Daubert decisions of that court, only an en banc 
decision could overrule the circuit's per se rule of 
inadmissibility of polygraph evidence. United States v. 
Prince-Oyibo, 320 F.3d 494, 497-501 (4th Cir. 2003). 
Judge Hamilton, dissenting, would have reversed and 
remanded the case to give the defendant the opportunity to 
show that his polygraph evidence was admissible under 
Daubert. See also United States v. Webster, 639 F.2d 174, 
186 (4th Cir. 1981 ) (admission of polygraph evidence may 
be proper, especially if requested by defense rather than by 
prosecution, and if a nonjury trial), opinion modified, 669 
F.2d 185 (4thCir.1982). 
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f. Voiceprint:Maryland Out, Federal Ma~e In 
i. Maryland 
Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 383, 391 A.2d 364,371 
(1978) (applying Frye and holding voiceprint 
inadmissible). 
ii. Federal 
See, e.g., United States v. Baller, 519 F.2d 463 (4th 
Cir. 1975) (no abuse of discretion in admitting) (citing 
conflicting federal decisions). 
5. Uniform Rules of Evidence: A Better Approach? 
Is there a better way? One possibility for a compromise 
modification of Frye-Reed is that adopted by the Uniform Law 
Commissioners. U.R.E. 702 (1999) uses Frye as the initial test, but a 
party dissatisfied with the result under Frye may challenge it by relying on 
the Daubert factors to prove that it is "more probable than not that the 
principle or method" is reasonably reliable (or not). 
See Myrna Raeder, Proposed Revisions to the Uniform Rules of 
Evidence, AALS Evidence Section Newsletter, 2-3, Spring 1998 ("This 
proposal was believed to give judges the benefit of relying on the scientific 
community at the outset, while still giving the adverse litigant the 
opportunity to demonstrate the actual reliability or unreliability of the 
principle or methodology in question. Ultimately, a rule codifying 
Daubert was viewed as requiring the judge to make a reliability 
determination in virtually every case, while this hybrid standard 
would both cut down the amount of challenges and also reestablish 
the judge's ability to rely on the scientific community until challenged, 
rather than requiring an independent evaluation of reliability from the 
outset."). 
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